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What Good Is Habeas?
Aziz Z. Huq
[Forthcoming -- Constitutional Commentary (2010)]
This essay examines empirically the effect of the Supreme Court’s 2008 judgment
in Boumediene v. Bush, which held that detainees at the Guantánamo Naval Base
in Cuba had a right to invoke federal court habeas jurisdiction. Boumediene
marked a sharp temporal break because it introduced a new regime of
constitutionally mandated habeas jurisdiction for non-citizens detained as
“enemy combatants” at Guantánamo. The Boumediene Court envisaged habeas
jurisdiction as serving a twofold purpose. First, it claimed habeas vindicates
physical liberty interests in line with a longstanding historical understanding of
the Writ. Second, the Court viewed habeas as a mechanism to generate or
preserve legal boundaries on executive discretion. This essay gathers empirical
evidence of the opinion’s effect up to January 2010 to determine whether these
goals were fulfilled. While the data is in many respects ambiguous, it strongly
suggests the effect of Boumediene on detention policy was not as significant as
many believe. For example, less than four percent of releases from the Cuban
base have followed a judicial order of release. Even in those cases, it is unclear if
judicial action or something else caused release. Because the effects of habeas
jurisdiction have been uncertain and perhaps marginal, effusive praise or blame
of the Court’s 2008 decision is premature.
Few axioms of constitutional law seem more self-evident today than the proposition that
the Great Writ of habeas corpus, as protected by the Suspension Clause,1 is a “vital instrument of
individual liberty.”2 Also largely common ground is the idea that habeas at its “historical core …
has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention.”3 So understood, the
habeas writ ranks as “an essential mechanism in the separation-of-powers scheme.”4 It is one of
the “necessary constitutional means” vested by the Constitution’s text in one branch “to resist
encroachments of the others” as part of a “constant aim … to divide and arrange the several
offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other.”5 The integration of habeas
into a larger account of the Constitution’s separation-of-powers architecture played a prominent
role in Justice Kennedy’s recent majority opinion in Boumediene v. Bush,6 which has been



Assistant professor of law, University of Chicago Law School. My thanks to Baher Azmy, Joe Margulies, Eric
Posner, and Matt Waxman for extremely helpful comments. Tim Greene and Amy Hermalik provided superlative
research assistance. All errors, of course, are mine only.
1
U.S. CONST. ART. I. §9, cl.2.
2
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 US --, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2246 (2008).
3
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001).
4
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2246.
5
THE FEDERALIST 51 at 321-22 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961).
6
128 S. Ct. 2229, 2246 (2008); cf. Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene’s Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the
Separation of Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2109, 2110 (2009) (“The Boumediene majority opinion expressly
invokes the separation of powers in at least ten additional passges”).
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consequently labeled “one of the most important Supreme Court decisions in recent years.”7
Even Boumediene’s critics do not doubt habeas has policy consequences, even if they profess to
be “mystif[ied]” as to why a check on executive detention power is necessary.8
This essay questions the conventional wisdom about habeas as a “check” on the
executive branch. In Boumediene, the Supreme Court supplied a twofold normative justification
for constitutional habeas jurisdiction: It first directly promotes physical liberty, and second
reinforces the separation of powers by preserving a limited government via unambiguous legal
constraints on the executive branch. Using the aftermath of Boumediene as a case study, I argue
that habeas has had at best a complex, largely indirect, effect on detention policy. In the end, the
effect of habeas is far more ambiguous than either critics or fans of Boumediene have
recognized. Harsh criticism and extravagant praise of the Court should both be tempered in the
teeth of persisting empirical uncertainty.
Empirical and doctrinal data for this essay are drawn from litigation and judicial opinions
following the Supreme Court’s Boumediene opinion. Boumediene concerned the scope of
judicial supervision of detention operations at the Guantánamo Naval Base in Cuba. Boumediene
marked a temporal break because it introduced a new regime of constitutionally mandated
habeas jurisdiction. Until June 12, 2008, there was doubt about the availability of habeas to noncitizens detained as “enemy combatants” at Guantánamo. It was “widely assumed that the Court
would not intervene to invalidate executive action clearly authorized by statute that implicated
military matters and foreign policy during a time of war.”9 So for many Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion for the Court was a surprise. It also set in motion a new line of district court
litigation—the “enemy combatant” habeas—with novel procedural rules, substantive standards
invented on the fly, and few preexisting expectations. That litigation provides evidence of
Boumediene’s effect on the executive’s policy options. While natural experiments about
constitutional design choices are rare,10 Boumediene sets up an opportunity to examine (no doubt
through a cloudy lens) the effect of one abrupt shift in constitutional design.
Part I of the essay describes Boumediene and situates the Court’s theory of habeas as part
of the separation of powers. Part II analyzes the consequences of post-Boumediene litigation. I
examine first empirical data about detainee policy, and then turn to the doctrinal aftermath. Part

7

Ronald Dworkin, Why It Was a Great Victory, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 14,. 2008, at 18, 18
See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY AND THE COURTS
256 (2007) (“There is no reason to think that the executive would benefit from an excessive detention or conviction
rate, or that political constraints would permit the executive to implement such a preference in any event.”).
9
Adrian Vermeule, Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4, 39 (2009).
10
We cannot, for instance, unspool history’s tape to see how what would be different if, say, the Framers had
prohibited atextual supermajority rules explicitly in both federal legislative chambers. Cf. GARY KING, ROBERT O.
KEOHANE & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 77-78
(1994) (arguing for a counterfactual definition of causality).
8
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III offers some tentative explanations for data presented in Part II, while underscoring quite how
much remains empirically elusive.
I.
What role does habeas jurisdiction, as guaranteed by the Suspension Clause, play in the
constitutional order?11 According to Justice Kennedy’s Boumediene opinion, habeas jurisdiction
not only promotes liberty but also plays a prominent function in the separation of powers.12 But
the strong connection between habeas and the separation of powers elaborated by Justice
Kennedy is neither obvious nor necessary. To the contrary, it is of recent vintage, and finds roots
as much in Justice Kennedy’s views on structural constitutionalism as it does in the storied
history of habeas.
A recent comprehensive account of habeas’s origins in its original early English context
has argued that the writ was not a liberty-promoting restraint but “fundamentally an instrument
by which the sovereign, through his judges, might ensure that his authority was not abused when
an officer acting in the king’s name imprisoned someone.”13 On this account, habeas was at its
inception not a tool for dispersing power within government. Even its later celebration as a limit
on “arbitrary government” was largely a “fiction.”14 Until at minimum the seventeenth century,
habeas operated in a political regime wherein “every … instrument of authority in England
shared the same legal and conceptual source: the king.”15 In this context, it was a mechanism for
reducing the cost of agency slack for the government’s sole principal—the monarch.16 It was a
means for the king to rein in potentially wayward vassals, not a tool of liberty.
By contrast, in the American context the Framers proposed a federal government
designed “first [to] enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place [to]

11

I leave aside two, largely settled questions here to focus on the “historical core” of federal court habeas: First,
should the Suspension Clause be read to guarantee state habeas jurisdiction over federal custody? The Supreme
Court rejected this position more than a century ago. See, e.g., Tarble’s Case, 80, U.S. 397, 411-12 (1872). In any
case, it is hard to see how state habeas could play this ambitious role now without reworking the state court bench
and fundamentally altering the larger political relationship of the states to the federal government. Second, does the
Constitution require federal court habeas review of state court criminal judgments even absent the statutory authority
created in 1867, see Act of Feb. 5, 1867, c.28, §1, 14 Stat. 385-386? I thus do not take up the debate as to whether
the 1789 Judiciary Act would have allowed the federal courts to supervise state criminal proceedings.
12
See text accompanying notes 31to 54.
13
Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American
Implications, & 575, 587 (2008); see also WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS
14-17 (1980) (tracing habeas’s function back to Norman consolidation of government power). In his magisterial new
history of habeas, Halliday provides a compelling account of this monarchical usage of the writ. See PAUL D.
HALLIDAY, FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 64-95 (2010).
14
DUKER, supra note 13, at 40-41 (describing interactions of the Court of Common Pleas and the Privy Council).
15
Halliday & White, supra note 13, at 595 n.39.
16
Moreover, it was a mechanism for centralizing jurisdiction in the King’s Bench. See DUKER, supra note 13, at 3340. This is the inverse of its purported role under the separation of powers.
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oblige it to control itself.”17 The principal in the American model is obviously no longer a king
or central executive, but “the people.” To control agency costs in this new model, which arose
from unavoidable slack between the people’s instructions and their representatives’ actions,
James Madison emphasized above all elections as tools to enable popular monitoring and control
of elected agents.18 But he also praised the fragmentation and allocation of government power
across three branches as an “auxiliary” design feature to dampen the misuse of power.19
Habeas takes on a new role for this new context. In one regard, American habeas is less
significant than its English cousin. In the English context, recent histories have argued, access to
habeas was a “critical marker of subjecthood,” an indicia of the bond between subject and
sovereign monarchy.20 There is no evidence I know of from the American context that habeas
had quite the same symbolic weight.21 On the contrary, what is striking is how marginal a role
habeas plays in the Federalist Papers’ canonical account of the separation of powers. In the
Federalist 84, Alexander Hamilton devoted only a handful of sentences to describe habeas as a
remedy for a particular harbinger of tyranny—the “secretly hurrying” of a person off the jail out
of public sight.22 Madison’s classic explication of separated powers, earlier in the Federalist
Papers, does not linger on habeas. Hence, even if habeas was significant to the Framers, the writ
was not a central architectural feature of the new Constitution’s dispersion of powers, as least as
described in the Federalist Papers.
Subsequent American debates about habeas have centered on the scope of legislative
control over the writ. In one of the first judicial expositions of the writ’s meaning, Chief Justice
Marshall seemed to split the difference, holding that power to award the writ “must be given by
written law,” but once jurisdiction had vested, “the meaning of the term habeas corpus,” would

17

THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961); accord Halliday & White, supra note 13,
at 672-73. It would be an error to think the Framers did not understand this shift. Alexander Hamilton in the
Federalist 84 argued that bills of rights were inapposite in the American context because they are “in their origin,
stipulations between the kinds and their subjects.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter,
ed., 1961).
18
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (J. Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961) (describing dependence on the people” as
“the primary control of the government”). Agency costs might be reduced by either monitoring or selection. See
generally TIMOTHY BESLEY, PRINCIPLED AGENTS? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GOOD GOVERNANCE 99 (2006)
(discussing agency problems in constitutional design).
19
I do not mean to suggest that Madison thought that the principal’s view could be reduced to aggregated
democratic preferences. Nor do I address the surprisingly complex question of why (or even whether) fragmentation
promotes good outcomes. See M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1127, 1155-57 (2000) (“The exact reasons for a prohibition on the accumulation of government functions is
surprisingly difficult to pin down.”) (hereinafter Magill, Real Separation)..
20
Halliday & White, supra note 13, at 634.
21
Professor Oaks’s account of habeas in the states suggests that Founding-era evidence of habeas’s significance is at
best ambiguous. See Dallin H. Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States—1776-1867, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 243, 247-51
(1965) (discussing early state constitutional treatment of habeas, and noting, inter alia, that in 1787 only four states’
constitutions guaranteed it).
22
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961).

4

Draft
be given “unquestionably [by] … the common law.”23 Even in the twentieth century, there was
still no consensus as to how habeas operated. In 2001, a view of habeas as a weak, essentially
majoritarian institution still commanded substantial minority of the Supreme Court. Writing for
four dissenting Justices, Justice Scalia argued that the Suspension Clause “does not guarantee
any content to (or even the existence of the writ of habeas corpus),” but rather regulated one
particular species of majoritarian abuse linked to emergencies.24 On Justice Scalia’s view,
constitutional habeas regulates agency costs largely by making suspension rest on legislative
preferences. Unsuspended, the writ falls within plenary congressional control.25 At most, this
might preclude the executive from asserting a unilateral “Merryman power” to ignore a court’s
command absent suspension.26 By Justice Scalia’s admission, this is hardly a robust bulwark of
separation of powers.
The case law also contains a stronger view of habeas founded in the preservation of
human liberty from arbitrary executive branch action. Habeas, of course, has long been
associated with freedom from physical constraint.27 In 1963, at the dawn of habeas’s revival as
an instrument of state-court regulation, Justice Brennan explained that habeas’s “function has
been to provide a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to be intolerable
restraints.”28 Habeas, he contended, redressed “denials of due process of law.”29 In 2001, a
majority of the Court in INS v. St Cyr further styled the writ as a “means of reviewing the legality
of Executive detention” to ensure compliance with legislated limitations, including the
availability vel non of discretionary relief from detention.30 Liberty in St. Cyr was tied to legality.
But Justice Stevens’s St. Cyr opinion did not articulate a more general or abstract account of how
habeas furthers the separation of powers.
That integration of habeas into a larger account of separation of powers occurs in Justice
Kennedy’s 2008 Boumediene opinion.31 Boumediene’s refinement, however, may be best
understand as part of a more general theory of separation of powers that Justice Kennedy has
23

Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 94, 96 (1807)
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 337-39 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
25
Justice Scalia’s account of habeas in effect accepts Robert Dahl’s critique of Madisonian democracy as in tension
with majoritarian democracy. See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 31-33 (rev. ed. 2006).
26
See Ex parte Merryman, 17 Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1961) (No. 9487). Michael Stokes Paulsen usefully describes
President Lincoln’s refusal to honor judicial process in Merryman as an example of “autonomous executive branch
interpretation.” Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch
Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81, 83 (1993).
27
See, e.g., Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712 (1961) (calling habeas “the highest safeguard of liberty”).
28
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400-01 (1963). Obviously, this diverged from the canonical understanding of many
English legal historians. See Dallin H. Oaks, Legal History in the High Court—Habeas Corpus, 64 MICH. L. REV.
451, 459-68 (1966).
29
Fay, 372 U.S. at 401.
30
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301, 303-04.
31
Eric Posner has fairly noted that Boumediene also “turns on an implicit theory about the rights of noncitizens …
that is prior to the conception of separation of powers.” Eric A. Posner, Boumediene and the Uncertain March of
Judicial Cosmopolitanism, 2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 12, 12.
24
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developed over three decades in cases unrelated to habeas or the Suspension Clause. To
understand this theory, it is helpful to consider first Boumediene’s holding and then to situate the
case against the backdrop of Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence.
Boumediene held that non-citizen detainees at the Guantánamo Naval Base “have the
habeas corpus privilege” notwithstanding legislation eliminating statutory habeas jurisdiction for
their petitions.32 Justice Kennedy’s opinion began by asking whether the scope of the writ in
1789 provided guidance as to the territorial scope of the writ or its application to enemy aliens
today.33 Finding no clear answer to these questions in Founding-era materials, Justice Kennedy
invoked instead a originalist understanding of habeas’s purpose to inform a contemporary
reading of the Suspension Clause. Habeas’s English history, Kennedy suggested, demonstrated
that “pendular swings to and away from individual liberty were endemic to undivided,
uncontrolled power.”34 In Kennedy’s account, the 1679 Habeas Corpus Act was a watershed in
the development of liberal limited government.35 (Historians, by contrast, have cast that law as
“merely codif[ying]” judicial practices and not preventing “important innovations” via common
law elaboration36). Reasoning from that historical example, Justice Kennedy then articulated a
strong connection between “the protection of individual liberties” and the American “separationof-powers scheme.”37 Liberty and the separation of powers are thus intertwined.
Justice Kennedy then suggested that “the Suspension Clause”—or rather the jurisdiction
guaranteed against displacement by that Clause—“is designed to protect against … cyclical
abuses [during emergencies],” by ensuring that “except during periods of formal suspension, the
Judiciary will have a time-tested device, the writ, to maintain the ‘delicate balance of
government.’”38 The writ’s protections thus do not reside solely in the fact that it imposes
publicity and political costs on an abrogation of the writ as Justice Scalia suggested.39 Rather, it
is the ordinary availability of federal courts’ habeas jurisdiction that promotes both liberty and
the separation of powers.
32

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 US --, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008).
Id. at 2244; see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (noting that “at the absolute minimum” the
Suspension Clause protects the writ as it existed in 1789).
34
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2246.
35
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2245 (citing 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *137).
36
Halliday & White, supra note 13, at 611-12; see also id. (“A persistent misapprehension about the English history
of habeas is that the ‘Great Writ’ was a parliamentary rather than a judicial gift.”).
37
Id. at 2246. Because the separation of powers serves to limit government power generally, Justice Kennedy
explained, its discrete manifestations, such as habeas and the requirements of bicameralism and presentment, benefit
not only citizens but also “foreign nationals who have the privilege of litigating in our courts.” Id. (citing INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating legislative veto)).
38
Id. (quoting Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 US 507, 536 (2004) (plurality op.)); cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 (1963)
(“It is no accident that habeas corpus has time and again played a central role in national crises wherein the claims of
order and liberty clash most acutely ….”)
39
See Amanda Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600, 687 (2009) (arguing that “exercises
of the [suspension] power must be closely guarded and carefully checked to ensure that the power is not invoked
except in the most dire of national emergencies”).
33
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The opinion, however, does not clearly articulate the way in which habeas jurisdiction
will play this function. Justice Kennedy provided but vague guidance as to either the procedural
contours or the substantial standards that would be applied in determining eligibility for habeas
relief.40 The closest the Boumediene opinion comes to specifying a mechanism for constraining
government is a passage concerning the Constitution’s ratification debates, in which Justice
Kennedy claims that the Suspension Clause guarantees “an affirmative right to judicial inquiry
into the causes of detention.”41 Later in the opinion, he characterizes the habeas inquiry as
encompassing “a meaningful review of both the cause for detention and the Executive’s power to
detain.”42 While Justice Kennedy does not go on to explain how this serves the separation of
powers, his logic seemed to build on Justice Stevens’ St Cyr opinion: The function of habeas
jurisdiction, on this account, is to ensure compliance by the executive with the existing legal
rules that cabin the authority to detain.43 An additional premise seems to be that the enforcement
of legal constraints on the detention power plays a special role in the separation of powers
because of the centrality of physical liberty to political competition and debate.44
Nor does the Boumediene opinion contains a general account of the separation of powers.
The latter is a complex and contested idea that comprises ideas about both separation and
equilibrium between branches.45 But while Boumediene has little to say on the matter, its author,
Justice Kennedy, has given considerable thought to the separation of powers since 1978, when he
penned the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in INS v. Chadha.46 In Boumediene, he cites two of his own
earlier Supreme Court opinions in discussing the separation of powers47 Earlier Kennedy
jurisprudence should therefore inform a reading of Boumediene’s characterization of habeas and
the separation of powers.
As early as Chadha, then-Judge Kennedy articulated a distinctive vision of separation of
powers in the service of individual liberty. Writing for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, he
identified two “principal purposes” of the separation of powers: “preventing concentrations of
40

See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2266-67.
Id. at 2246.
42
Id. at 2269.
43
Another view would look to other constitutional entitlements as being protected by the Suspension Clause. See
Tyler, supra note 39, at 682 (arguing instead that “where a [constitutional] right is arguably bound up with the Great
Writ, it is protected from blanket displacement by the Suspension Clause’s terms”).
44
Cf. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 465 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Even more important than the
method of selecting the people's rulers and their successors is the character of the constraints imposed on the
Executive by the rule of law.”).
45
For a penetrating critique of several accounts of separation of powers, see M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers
and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 604 (2001) (arguing that “both commitments at
the center of separation of powers doctrine [separation and balance] are misconceived.”); id. at 609, n.13 (collecting
other views).
46
Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), aff’d 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
47
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2246 (citing Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996), and Clinton v. City of New
York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
41
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power dangerous to liberty and … promoting government efficiency.”48 The Chadha opinion,
however, does not explain how these goals are to be reconciled in cases they conflict. It is thus
only a first step toward a general account of the separation of powers.
As a Justice, Kennedy elaborated his understanding of the separation of power. The
efficiency motif by and large vanishes from his opinions.49 By contrast, Justice Kennedy has
pressed vigorously the theme of liberty. He has highlighted in particular a “fundamentally
political sense” of liberty that arises “inheres in [governmental] structure” absent any
enumeration of constitutional rights.50 People benefit from “fundamentally political” liberty, on
this account, when they delegate political power to a government in which “one branch of
government [does] not possess the power to shape their destiny without a sufficient check from
the other two.”51 For Justice Kennedy, this proves especially so in moments of crisis.52 Liberty,
for Justice Kennedy, is a state of mind. It is the psychological assurance that each element of
government will be checked by other elements.53 So “[w]hen structure fails, liberty is always is
peril”54 because such assurance evaporates. It follows that “fundamentally political” liberty is
best promoted by clear, unambiguous limits on government power.55
There is, no doubt, a touch of the ineffable to all this. But Boumediene’s authorship and
its citations nonetheless suggest the Court takes it seriously. To summarize, the function of post48

Chadha, 634 F.2d at 425; id. at 422-24 (describing the separation of powers as first, as a means to prevent
“unnecessary and therefore dangerous concentration of power in one branch” and second, as a “practical measure to
facilitate administration of a large nation” by precluding “cumbersome entanglement” of Congress in laws’
administration). Kennedy’s other Ninth Circuit opinion that addresses separation of powers takes the formalist
approach directed by Chief Justice Burger’s Chadha opinion. See Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v.
Instrumedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537 (1984) (upholding 28 U.S.C. §636(c), which allows magistrates to conduct civil
trials with all parties’ consent).
49
It briefly resurfaces, for example, in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Fdn, Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 61\6 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The Executive Branch should be free, as a general matter, to discover new ideas, to
understand pressing public demands, and to find creative responses to address governmental concerns.”), and Loving
v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757-58 (1996) (connecting the separation of powers to “effective and accountable”
government). See also Magill, Real Separation, supra note 19, at 1184 (discussing efficiency as a separation-ofpowers value).
50
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
51
Id.; see also Loving, 517 U.S. at 756 (“[S]eparation of powers [is] a defense against tyranny.”). So defined,
“political liberty” is separate and distinct from any substantive conception of rights.
Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“It remains
one of the most vital functions of this Court to police with care the separation of the governing powers.” That is so
even when, as is the case here, no immediate threat to liberty is apparent.”).
52
Cf. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 637 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Respect for laws derived from the
customary operation of the Executive and the Legislative Branches gives some assurance of stability in time of
crisis.”).
53
Clinton, 524 U.S. at 250 (“The individual loses liberty in a real sense if [government policy] is not subject to
traditional constitutional constraints.”).
54
Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 468 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
55
For a different analysis of the interests served by judicial review in detention cases, see Daphne Barak-Erez &
Matthew C. Waxman, Secret Evidence and the Due Process of Terrorist Detentions, -- Colum. J. Transnational L.
(forthcoming 2010), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/columbia_pllt/9174/ (distinguishing interests in individual
dignity, accuracy, and systemic regulation).
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Boumediene habeas jurisdiction over Guantánamo detainees’ petitioners is a twofold protection
of liberty interests. First, habeas vindicates physical liberty interests in line with a longstanding
historical understanding of the Writ. Second, it is also, and perhaps more significantly, a
mechanism to generate or preserve legal boundaries on executive discretion so as to ensure what
Justice Kennedy has called fundamental political liberty. That value in turn is intertwined with
the Constitution’s separation of powers.
II.
Boumediene created a rare opportunity to consider the effects of habeas jurisdiction. Does
habeas directly benefit human liberty in the sense of ending unlawful detentions that in the
absence of jurisdiction’s exercise would continue? Does it enlarge liberty in Justice Kennedy’s
“fundamentally political” sense of living with a constrained federal government? This section
considers both questions by examining the aftermath of the Boumediene decision. I first sketch
the background to the Supreme Court’s Boumediene opinion. I then identify sources of evidence
about its effects. In the central section of this paper, I consider the evidence of Boumediene’s
direct effect on detention policy at Guantánamo. I turn then to the less tractable question whether
Boumediene had consequences for “fundamentally political” liberty by considering the way in
which the opinion changed or confirmed the black-letter law of executive detention.
A.
Boumediene provides a rare glimpse at in separation-of-powers jurisprudence’s effect on
the ground.56 Boumediene abruptly changed expectations about the exercise of habeas
jurisdiction over petitions from Guantánamo. It was the first time the Supreme Court had
invalidated a federal statute purporting to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts.57 And it
did so even after the Court had initially signaled, via a threshold denial of certiorari (later
reconsidered), that it did not intend to police executive policy choices closely.58 While its effect
was not a shift from “no jurisdiction” to “plenary jurisdiction,” Boumediene still disrupted
government actors’ expectations about detention policy’s exposure to judicial supervision. To
understand why requires some background about the detention policy at issue.
In its origins, the military detention operation at Guantánamo was crafted to be beyond
federal court jurisdiction. Before the first detainees were transported to the base, although not
before construction of detention facilities, government lawyers had concluded that the federal
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This paper is hardly novel in proposing such an inquiry. For a pathbreaking example of such analysis, see JESSICA
KORN, THE POWER OF SEPARATION (1998) (studying the effects of abrogation of the legislative veto in Chadha).
57
Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Guantánamo: The Boumediene Decision, 2009 SUP. CT. REV.
1, 1; see also id. at 13-20.
58
See Boumediene v. Bush, 551 U.S. 1161 (2007) (mem. op.)
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courts lacked jurisdiction over the base.59 Habeas actions first filed on behalf of detainees in
February 2002 were answered by threshold motions to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds.60 The
Supreme Court’s 2004 statutory ruling in Rasul v. Bush,61 affirming the availability of statutory
jurisdiction, precipitated the filing of many habeas petitions. Congress, however, responded to
Rasul by stripping habeas and channeling cases into a new jurisdictional avenue in the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals under the 2005 Detainee Treatment Act (“DTA”).62 That
jurisdictional strip was reaffirmed by Congress in 2006.63
Due to the DTA review mechanism, Boumediene hardly wrote on a jurisdictional tabla
rasa. Yet uncertainty still obtained about the scope of Court of Appeals review under the DTA.
One year before Boumediene, the D.C. Circuit had defined the record for the purposes of this
new avenue of review to include all “reasonably available information in the possession of the
U.S. Government bearing on the issue of whether the detainee meets the criteria to be designated
as an enemy combatant.”64 This ruling prompted vigorous protests from the government, which
argued it did not have all “reasonably available” information, and that gathering “reasonably
available” information would be prohibitively burdensome.65 Such protest suggests that circuit
court review under the DTA might have had real bite.66 We will never know. This avenue of
review was exercised in only one case prior to Boumediene.67 Still, its availability means that the
legal effect of Boumediene was only a change in the kind of judicial oversight, not an absolute
shift in its availability.
New judicial superintendence took the form of individualized district court litigation in
the District of Columbia District Court. That litigation did not begin quickly after Boumediene.
59

Memorandum for William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of Defense from Patrick Philbin and John
C. Yoo, “Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over Aliens Held in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba,” December 28, 2001, available
at http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:20011228-philbin-yoo-guantanamo-habeus-memo.pdf; cf. KAREN
GREENBERG, THE LEAST WORST PLACE: GUANTANAMO’S FIRST 100 DAYS 43 (2009) (describing initial construction
before then).
60
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 US --, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2241 (2008).
61
542 U.S. 466 (2004).
62
See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680 (2005) (“DTA”) (reprinted at 10
U.S.C.§801 note).
63
See Military Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (“MCA”) (codified in part at 28
U.S.C.§2241and note).
64
Bismillah v. Gates, 503 F.3d 137, 138-39 (D.C. Cir. 2007), petition for rehearing en banc denied 514 F.3d 1291
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
65
See 514 F.3d at 1306-07 (Brown, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (summarizing and endorsing
government’s complaints). It is impossible not to observe that the government was in effect claiming that it could
lock up men for eight, going on nine years, without process, even though it did not have to hand “reasonably
available” information pertaining to that detention decision.
66
At least in some instances, a habeas petitioner’s ability to seek discovery and introduce exculpatory evidence in
ways that the DTA would not have allowed may have been outcome dispositive. See, e.g., Al Rabiah v. United
States, -- F. Supp. 2d --. 2009 WL 3083077 at *8 (D.D.C. 2009) (granting petition based on exculpatory evidence
based on extensive discovery by petitioner’s counsel). I am grateful to Baher Azmy for drawing my attention to Al
Rabiah,
67
See Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (granting detainees’ petitions for review).
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Initially, Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan consolidated the habeas cases and in November 2008
and issued a case management order stipulating rules for discovery, the content and order of
filing, and burdens of proof.68 Not all judges followed Chief Judge Hogan’s lead. Judge Richard
Leon moved forward separately. On November 20, 2008, Judge Leon became the first district
court judge to resolve a Guantánamo habeas petition.69 Numerous other district court judges have
followed suit in reaching the merits of habeas actions before them. Judges have reached a variety
of procedural rulings and sketched divergent accounts of the scope of detention authority. In
March 2009, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion in a long-pending interlocutory
appeal resolving some procedural questions concerning classified evidence and the scope of
discovery.70 In January 2010, the court of appeals issued its first ruling concerning the scope of
detention authority with respect to Guantánamo detainees.71 As of this writing, the postBoumediene habeas is very much a work in progress.
The post-Boumediene inception of habeas did not mark the beginning of releases from
Guantánamo. Releases have been ongoing since at least 2003. On December 16, 2008, just
before the first detainees who obtained final relief from a federal court were released, there were
248 detainees in the facility.72 Since the facility opened in 2002 and 2008, 779 prisoners had
been detained there.73 Habeas, therefore, operated against the backdrop of an ongoing circulation
of prisoners and also ongoing efforts to process the prison population for release. One result of
these changes has been an alleged “shift in the detainee population [at Guantánamo] toward Al
Qaeda personnel and away from Afghan Taliban and foreign fighters.”74 That is, as more and
more detainees have been processed, the remaining population increasingly comprises
individuals alleged to have closer connections to terrorist groups.
By the end of 2009, about a year into the Obama presidency, there was thus a significant
body of evidence comprising judicial opinions and policy changes about the operation of
constitutionally mandated habeas. This evidence of habeas’s operation up through the end of

68

See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 08-0442, Case Management Order at 3 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008).
Judge Hogan was selected as coordinating judge to handle uniform procedural issues in the cases so that they could
be “addressed as expeditiously as possible as required by the Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush.” Resolution of
the Executive Session (D.D.C. July 1, 2008), available at http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/publicdocs/system/files/Guantanamo-Resolution070108.pdf. Judges Richard Leon and Emmett Sullivan declined to
transfer their cases. Sarah Lorr, Note, Reconciling Classified Evidence and A Petitioner’s Right to Meaningful
Review at Guantánamo Bay, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2669, 2670 n.13 (2009).
69
Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191 (D.D.C. 2008).
70
Al Odah v. United States, 559 F.3d 539, 546-47 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (explaining that procedural issues
would be resolved by analogy to the DTA mechanisms and criminal trial procedures).
71
Al-Bihani v. Obama, -- F.3d --, 2010 WL 10411 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 5, 2010).
72
Benjamin Wittes & Zaahira Wyne, The Current Detainee Population of Guantánamo: An Empirical Study 1 (Dec.
2008), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2008/1216_detainees_wittes/1216_detainees_wittes.pdf.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 2.
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January 2010,75 moreover, can usefully be set alongside evidence about detention operations
prior to Boumediene, when only an uncertain quantum of appellate review under the DTA
obtained. The two sets of evidence enable a rough evaluation of the effects of constitutionally
mandated habeas jurisdiction.
B.
To test the Court’s aspirations for habeas, it is necessary to look at patterns of detention
and release before and after Boumediene. In introducing this evidence, it is worth emphasizing
again that it does not come from a controlled experiment. Rather, it compromises observations
before and after June 2008. The data certainly cannot show whether any observed change to
release decisions and rates is caused by habeas or by another unobserved variable. At best, this
data allows us to suggestions about what might plausibly be the case, to rule out some
hypotheses, and to identify possible unobserved variables. It emphatically is not evidence of
causation.
Accurate data about detention operations at the Guantánamo Naval Base has long been
hard to secure. As the Brookings Institution has observed, “the government has never identified
the interned population in a contemporaneous fashion.”76 The data used for this paper are derived
from several sources. First and most importantly, information about the date and volume of
releases or transfers, the net detainee population at Guantánamo, and the total numbers of
detainees released or transferred at any point in time has been drawn from statements and
releases by the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Department of Justice.77 Arguably, data
about the timing of releases is secondary in importance to data about the timing of internal
decisions to release, if the latter better reflects the impact of judicial action on executive
behavior. But the latter data is not publically available. Until the transition from the Bush to the
Obama Administration, primary responsibility for releasing this data rested with the Department
of Defense. After January 2009, data was released instead by the Department of Justice. In a
break from Pentagon practice, the latter has not been releasing information on the total number
of detainees remaining at the Cuban base (although that data is occasionally available via press
reports).
The second source of information concerning the habeas litigation used for this article is
not governmental. Rather, nongovernmental actors such as the New York Times, ProPublica, and
the Brookings Institute have developed data bases. Rather than reconstructing this data from
scratch, I have chosen to rely on these existing sources. The data presented here was thus drawn
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The data for this article was gathered in December 2009 and January 2010. The article does not address
subsequent developments.
76
Wittes & Wyne, supra note 72, at 5.
77
Copies of all material relied on for this data are on file with the author and are available on request.
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initially from databases developed by the New York Times and ProPublica.78 It was crosschecked against the Westlaw database, data issued by the government.79
It should be noted that the data is likely unreliable at the margins even if it accurately
captures trends. For example, the government is not always forthright about either releases or
suicides at the base.80 Hence, it is quite possible that the data for the aggregate number of
detainees at the base in particular is occasionally off by a small margin. Moreover, government
statements concerning the release of detainees do not include the names of detainees or the
precise dates of release, introducing a source of possible error.
C.
Consider first the interaction between habeas and simple physical liberty. To what extent
does habeas have the effect of increasing the weight assigned to liberty interests as against
security interests in a way that changes policy outcomes? Does habeas, in other words, both
vindicate liberty interests and also change the policy space available to the executive?
One way of assessing habeas is to compare the pattern of releases before and after
Boumediene. I thus begin by looking at first the pattern of releases and detentions at Guantánamo
in the larger context of 2002 to 2009. Figure 1 reports two statistics: The total number of
prisoners at Guantánamo and the total number of Guantánamo prisoners that had been released at
a given point in point. Again, this data is drawn from government press releases that are not
evenly spaced temporally, but the graph has been modified so that each year occupies an equal
amount of space on the x-axis.
[Insert Fig. 1]
Because the data in Figure 1 are not immediately amenable to generalization, it is worth
looking at the same data in annualized form. Table 1 and Figure 2 report the net detainee
population and the cumulative number of detainees transferred or released at the end of each
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Transferred--The Guantanamo Docket, N.Y. Times,
http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/transferred; Propublica, An Examination of 31 Gitmo Detainee
Lawsuits, December 17, 2009, available at http://www.propublica.org/special/an-examination-of-31-gitmo-detaineelawsuits-722.
79
Data gathered by British journalist Andy Worthington was also consulted, but is not organized in a form that
allows easy cross-reference. See Andy Worthington, Guantánamo: The Definitive Prisoner List, available at
http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/guantanamo-the-definitive-prisoner-list-part-1/.
80
Governance Studies at Brookings, Update to The Current Detainee Population of Guantánamo: An Empirical
Study, at 7 (October 2009), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2008/1216_detainees_wittes/1216_detainees_wittes_supplement.
pdf
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calendar year since 2002. Table 1 reports changes in population and aggregate transfers/releases
by year, and breaks out the number transferred or released in a given year.81
Table 1: Guantánamo population changes, aggregate releases/transfers, and annualized
releases and transfers (2002–9)
Cumulative Number
Number
End of
of Detainees
transferred/
Year
Transferred or
released in year to
Released*
date
2002
625
--2003
660
--2004
549
202
-2005
500
256
54
2006
395
380
124
2007
275
500
120
2008
250
520
120
2009
198†
560
40
* Data comes from the final press release issued by the government in a
calendar year; † reported by New York Times on January 11, 2010. No
government number is available
Net Detainee
Population at
Guantánamo*

[Insert Fig. 2 here]
One additional set of data is useful in understanding the context of these trends.
Guantánamo is not the sole internment facility used by the U.S. government for detainees in
terrorism-related operations. The Bagram Theater Internment Facility, located just north of
Kabul, Afghanistan, has been used for both individuals seized in the Afghanistan-Pakistan
conflict and also globally.82 Trends in aggregate detainee population at Bagram may be driven by
two factors: developments in the regional conflict, and, to the extent the base provides an
substitute to Guantánamo, governmental decisions to divert the flow of detainees from Cuba to
Afghanistan. Data on the Bagram, however, is scarce. Figure 3 compiles the fragmentary data
available from press and government sources concerning aggregate detention levels at Bagram.
(It should be noted that the x-axis on Figure 4 does not represent time in a linear fashion).
[Insert Fig. 3 here]
Five threshold observations can be made these multiyear data sets. First, the aggregate
detention population at Guantánamo peaked in 2003 and has been dropping ever since.
Anecdotal information suggests that inflows to the base largely dried up in 204, after the
81

No annualized number of transfers and releases is reported from 2004 because it is not clear whether all the 202
reported released or transferred by the end of 2004 were released in the calendar year of 2004.
82
See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 209 (D.D.C. 2009)
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Supreme Court’s first interventions in the field. The two largest transfers from the base
represented in Figure 1 do not occur at the end of the time period, when habeas jurisdiction was
in effect, but at the beginning. They are in i) July and November 2003 (respectively 27 and 20
transfers or releases), and ii) September 2004 (46 transfers or releases). It is worth noting what
was going on in the federal courts at this time: The Supreme Court granted the Rasul petitioners’
request for certiorari review on November 11, 2003,83 and issued its Rasul opinion on June 28,
2004.84
Second, after those initial large transfers, transfer and release patterns settle into a stable
pattern through mid-2008. Periodic releases of between ten and twenty detainees at one go
punctuate a steady drip-feed of daily releases in the single digits. The burst of movement from
2003-04 is not repeated. Moreover, the annualized number of releases remains stable. Indeed,
given the extraordinarily low variance in net release rates from 2006 to 2008, it is worth asking
whether patterns of release in this period were determined by an internal government quota
rather than by exogenous factors, such as information concerning detainees’ status or the
changing situation in countries of release.
Third, even within the otherwise stable period of 2006-08, some details merit attention.
For example, after the enactment of the DTA in December 2005, the rate of releases and
transfers did not manifest a discernable decline. On the contrary, transfers and releases double
between 2005 and 2006. There is also a distinct contrast between the first and second halves of
2007. In the first half of 2007, there were no days on which a double-digit transfer or release
occurred. In the second half of 2007, by contrast, there were six separate double-digit transfers.
In thinking about these trends, it is worth noting that the Supreme Court granted certiorari review
in Boumediene on June 29, 2007. Of course, there is no clear evidence this correlation signals
causation. An alternative explanation might rest of internal administrative dynamics that are not
available to an external observer, for example, around the iterative review processes made
available after Rasul for detainees at the base.
Fourth, the pattern of releases and transfers tails off dramatically in late 2008 and 2009.
With one exception, there are no further days on which a double-digit number of detainees is
transferred or released. Moreover, the total number of releases and transfers dropped by about
66.7% from a stable 2006-08 level to a lower level in 2009. That is, just as the number of days
on which significant numbers of releases and transfers declined, the overall number of release
and transfers also declined after three years of notable stability. The decline in transfers and
releases corresponds to the period in which habeas was available under Boumediene. It also
includes the period in which President Obama entered office and assumed control and direction
of detainee policy.
83
84

Rasul v. Bush, 540 U.S. 1003 (2003) (mem. op.)
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)
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Finally, aggregate detention levels at Bagram have been on the rise since 2004. It is
unclear whether this should be attributed to the changing dynamics of the Afghan conflict or to
diversions of transfers that would otherwise have gone to Guantánamo.85 At a minimum, the
trend line for Bagram raises the possibility that increased judicial scrutiny of Guantánamo results
not in less detention, but rather detention in a different location.
The 2002-2009 timeframe is not the only lens through which to examine the effects of
habeas. The effects of habeas might also be visible in time it has been available since
Boumediene. Figure 4 presents data from that timeframe. The first data point, from December
2008, is for the first set of releases of detainees who prevailed in the district court. It is hence a
portrait of how habeas as a release mechanism has coexisted with whatever clearance and release
mechanisms exist within the executive.
Figure 4 shows two sets of data: First, it illustrates “habeas releases,” i.e., releases of
detainees who had prevailed in a district court habeas action, from August 2008 to December
2009. Second, it registers the “non-habeas releases” during the same period: releases of detainees
who did not have a final judgment in a district court habeas action.86 This data derives from the
non-governmental sources noted above, and also government statements on releases. Every care
has been taken not to double count, although the incomplete form of government statements
about releases makes this a challenge.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
We might draw the following inferences from Figure 4 and underlying data. First, during
the period in which habeas was available and the district courts were exercising jurisdiction
pursuant to Boumediene, a total of 52 detainees were released. Second, from that total, 31 were
what I have called “non-habeas releases.” In the same time period, there were 21 were releases of
detainees who had prevailed already in habeas action in the district court. Otherwise stated, 60%
of those released in this period were “non-habeas releases,” and 40% were “habeas releases.” We
can also roughly calculate the proportion of total releases that have followed as a result of
habeas. As of December 9, 2009, 560 detainees had been released or transferred from the Cuban
base. Of that total, 3.75% were transferred subsequent to a final judicial order of release.

85

Data about the locus of capture for Bagram detainees broken down by time would be illuminating.
I have identified no case in which a detainee whose petition for habeas relief has been denied has been released.
“Non-habeas releases” includes releases of persons in the absence of a final remedial order. Given the limited kinds
of data available, however, it has been determined how many of the non-habeas releases are individuals with
pending habeas petitions (or at what stage their petitions are). This data was generated by cross-referencing
government statements about releases with information about habeas litigation generated by the New York Times and
others.
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16

Draft
Another perspective on the effect of habeas jurisdiction is obtained by excluding nonhabeas releases. In the period analyzed, there were 32 cases in which a district court had
adjudicated a habeas petition to completion and granted the petition on the ground that the
government lacked legal authority to hold the person. In the same period of time, there were nine
petitions for habeas relief denied. In total, there were 41 cases litigated to final judgment in the
district court during this period. Within that set of cases, therefore, the habeas petitioner
prevailed 78 percent of the time at the district-court level. To give some context to that number,
compare it to rate at which habeas is granted to petitioners convicted in state court and invoking
federal court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.§2254. (The comparison, of course, is not one of like to
like. State habeas petitioners have benefited from access to a court of record, while Guantánamo
detainees have access only to internal administrative procedures). A 2007 study found that of
2384 noncapital habeas cases, only eight resulted in a grant of habeas relief, and one was
reversed on appeal.87 In that post-conviction context, district courts thus grant relief 0.3% of the
time.
We see habeas’s effect in another light by looking at the relationship of formal victory in
a habeas action in the district court and the fact of physical release. Of the 32 cases in which a
petitioner prevails, moreover, 21 have been followed by transfers or releases. That is, in 65.6
percent of cases in which a habeas petition is victorious at the district court in a habeas action,
victory translates into physical release. It is worth noting that this number does not include any
cases in which the government chose to appeal a loss in the district court. That is, the rate of
releases represents not just releases in cases where the government has chosen to forego appeals.
Since past releases cannot be judicially undone on appeals, the percentage of releases as a
fraction of the total number of cases can only rise.
Table 2 provides another perspective on this data. It summarizes habeas litigation by
showing the percentage of cases in which a district court has reached a final adjudication and
decided in favor of the detainee. It also shows the number of cases in which the district court has
decided in favor of the government. Note that the table does not contain data on appeals. By
definition, proceedings in which a detainee has been released have not been appealed. But in
those cases in which an underlying detention persists, it of course remains open to a party to seek
appellate correction.
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Nancy J. King et al., Final Technical Report: Habeas Litigation in U.S. District Courts: An Empirical Study of
Habeas Corpus Cases Filed by State Prisoners Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 52, 58, 116
(2007), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219558.pdf.
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Table 2: District Court Habeas Litigation (August 2008 – December 2009)
Number

As a Percentage of all
Habeas Cases Decided

41

100 %

32

78%

21

51%

11

27%

Habeas Petitions Adjudicated (as
of December 31, 2009)
Habeas Petitions Decided by a
District Court in favor of the
habeas petitioner (as of December
31, 2009)
Number of ‘meritorious’ cases in
which relief follows
Number of ‘meritorious’ cases in
which petitioner remains
detained88

Again, this data shows that the rate at which district courts are granting the writ is far higher than
in the postconviction context. But there is an imperfect correlation between a district court
decision to grant the writ and a subsequent release order.
This empirical snapshot of detention policy at Guantánamo that has been reviewed in this
section reveals a surprisingly complex picture. After Boumediene, releases in the absence of a
final judgment from a habeas corpus continue to dominate over releases in the wake of a district
court remedial order. Non-habeas releases comprise a majority (60 percent) of total releases in
the late 2008-09 period. Yet the rate of detainee success in habeas actions has, at least through
the end of 2009, been surprisingly high, at least in comparison to §2254 habeas. Within the pool
of successful habeas petitioners in the district court, a majority of almost two-third obtain release
without the protracted process of an appeal. If a petitioner thus litigated a case to conclusion in
the district court, they were very likely to have prevailed, and if they prevailed they were likely
to have secured release. Thus, although habeas may not have dominated as a modality of release
either from 2002 to 2009, or from late 2008 to 2009, where it was used, release without the
government’s invocation of the appellate process followed in a surprisingly proportion of cases.
Individual physical liberty may not be directly vindicated by habeas in the aggregate, but the
connection between habeas and individual liberty in that narrow slice of cases seems robust.
D.
To assess whether habeas plays the two functions ascribed to it by Justice Kennedy’s
majority Boumediene opinion, it is also necessary to ask whether “fundamentally political”
liberty89 has been vindicated or confirmed since June 2009. As defined by Justice Kennedy, this
88

About half of these are Uighur detainees whose situation the Supreme Court is slated to consider in the first half
of 2010. See Kiyemba v Obama, 555 F3d 1022 (DC Cir 2009), pet. for cert, granted -- S Ct – (Oct. 20, 2009),
vacated and remanded --S. Ct. --, 2010 WL 680499 (March 1, 2010).
89
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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rather elusive concept apparently obtains only when citizens know that each branch of the federal
government, and in particular the executive, operates only within a domain defined and bounded
by legal limits. “Fundamentally political” liberty, that is, is promoted by legal clarity and the
ousting of ambiguity. Thus, we must ask whether Boumediene eliminated legal ambiguity about
the outer bounds of detention authority.
Three principal data points inform this inquiry: the Supreme Court’s Boumediene
opinion; the government’s subsequent legal positions; and the District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals’ January 5, 2010 judgment in Al-Bihani v. Obama, which essays a more extended
exposition of detention authority.90 The latter represents, at least at the time of this writing, the
dispositive legal rule concerning the scope of government detention power at Guantánamo.
Together, Boumediene, the government’s legal response, and Al-Bihani do little or nothing to
promote the “fundamental” political liberty celebrated in Justice Kennedy’s opinions. To the
contrary, the evidence reveals a gap between Boumediene’s aspirations and its effects on black
letter doctrine.
Consider first the legal consequences of Boumediene. In his majority opinion, Justice
Kennedy characterized the judicial function in habeas as one of conducting “a meaningful review
of both the cause and the Executive’s power to detain.”91 That authority derives centrally from
the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”).92 Even though the Court had
previously indicated it would flesh out the contours of that authority, 93 Boumediene provided no
supplemental guidance as to the metes and bounds of permissible detention authority. Instead,
the Court obliquely cast doubt on another aspect of the plurality opinion in Hamdi, which had to
that time provided the only High Court guidance on that question of law.94 The net result of
Boumediene, therefore, was to leave the substantive law of executive detention incrementally
murkier than before. While doctrinal ambiguity is often one outcome of Supreme Court review,
it is at last peculiar that an opinion justified as a means to promote legal certainty would leave so
much for subsequent resolution through an inevitably fragmented process of district court
resolution and appellate clarification. Boumediene, that is, can be criticized for failing to promote
the legal clarity that was one of its central normative premises. It was, from on one view, an
exercise in legality without law.
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-- F.3d --, 2010 WL 10411 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 5, 2010).
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 US --, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2269 (2008).
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Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). The executive might also claim separate authority under Article II of
the Constitution.
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In Hamdi, the plurality opinion declined to define the scope of detention power beyond the facts of the fact at
hand, but left the matter open for subsequent adjudication. Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 US 507, 522, n.1(2004) (plurality
op.) (noting that the “permissible bounds of the category will be defined by the lower courts as subsequent cases are
presented to them”).
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See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2269 (pointedly observing that the plurality in Hamdi “did not garner a majority of
the Court”).
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Second, Boumediene did not prompt any substantial change in the executive’s legal
position. But in the wake of both Boumediene and the subsequent shift from Bush to Obama
Administrations, the government bifurcated its definition of detention authority. It now applies
one definition in litigation and another in internal deliberations. This can only undermine the
clarity of boundaries on executive detention power.
Understanding this development demands a comparison of government legal positions
before and after Boumediene. During the Bush Administration, the government applied a unitary
functional understanding of AUMF-related detention authority. In federal court, the Justice
Department in 2008 invoked the definition of “enemy combatant” that had been applied in
military status hearings. The latter would have permitted the detention of any “individual who
was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners [including] … any person who has
committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.”95
The Obama Administration, however, has seemingly developed a bifurcated definition of
detention authority—a legal definition and a less stringent set of functional criteria for making
release decisions. It thus appears to have one definition of detention authority for internal
deliberations and a separate one for litigation. In the post-Boumediene habeas litigation, the
Holder Justice Department has offered a new definition of detention authority under the AUMF
that encompasses “persons that the president determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, … persons who harbored those
responsible for those attacks[, or] … who were part of or substantially supported, Taliban or alQaida forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its
coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act, or has directly
supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy armed forces.”96 This definition appears to differ in
one key regard from the Bush definition: While the Bush definition allowed detention of a
person who “supported” al Qaeda or the Taliban, the Obama definition requires “substantia[l]
support.” How much difference that distinction creates is still uncertain. It is telling, though. that
my research has revealed no habeas proceeding in which the Obama administration has reversed
course by declared by a detainee previously thought to fall under AUMF detention authority does
not in fact do so.97 So far, the operative value of the legal change appears de minimus.
More importantly, the Obama Administration appears to apply a wholly different calculus
in internal deliberations about detentions. In directing an interagency taskforce to assess
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Guantánamo detentions,98 President Obama did not require the taskforce to determine whether
detentions were lawful under the AUMF. Rather, he ordered new determinations whether
“continued detention is in the national security and foreign policy interests of the United
States.”99 In January 2010, the director of the interagency taskforce, Matthew Olsen, confirmed
that forward-looking risk assessments, not backward-looking judgments of legality, guides
release decision. In an interview with the BBC, Olsen explained that the taskforce asks whether a
“person be safely transferred out of the United States,” and not whether they fit within the
AUMF’s contours.100 The interaction between the legal floor and the seemingly discretionary
functional standard for release is unclear.
The pattern of subsequent releases confirms the application of this forward-looking
standard. The Administration has made categorical determinations against release based on risk
rather than legality. In the wake of the December 2009 attempt to down a Detroit-bound airplane,
for example, the Administration ceased detainees transfers to Yemen based on concerns about
the southern Arabian nation’s ability to handle returnees101 and “to implement adequate
mitigation measures to address any threat the detainee may pose.”102 The net result is a policy on
detention in which wholly different standards are invoked in internal deliberations and in federal
court litigation. Whether the bifurcation can be attributed to Boumediene or the change in
administrations, it is hard to see the post-Boumediene situation as a return to clear, consistently
applied constraints on executive detention authority.
The final data point for assessing Boumediene’s consequences for “fundamental political”
liberty is the D.C. Circuit’s January 5, 2010, opinion in Al-Bihani v. Obama, in which the court
of appeals set forth its views on the scope of detention authority under the AUMF.103 The AlBihani Court drew on language in the 2006 Military Commissions Act and its 2009 amendments
to hold that detention authority included those who “purposefully and materially supported
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners,” and to reject arguments offered by
both the habeas petitioner and the government that the laws of war bounded detention
authority.104 That is, the court of appeals looked to later-enacted statutes to give substance to the
ambiguous terms of the 2001 AUMF.
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Al-Bihani resolves some of the ambiguities left open by Boumediene but its approach to
statutory interpretation undermines the promotion of “fundamental political” liberty. At a
threshold matter, there may be little space between the Court’s “purposefully and materially
support[ing]” standard and the government’s substantial support standard. Faced with what at
best can be characterized as meaningful statutory ambiguity and a range of possible interpretive
strategies, the court in effect adopted one almost wholly favorable to the government’s claim of
detention authority. Al-Bihani then is clearly not characterized by the concerns about limiting
government expressed by the Supreme Court in Boumediene. But this is simply to say that the
government won, which may not be especially telling.
More significantly, the court of appeal’s methodological approach to statutory
interpretation belies the Boumediene Court’s account of the federal courts as a check on
government. Rather than looking to the canonical sources of statutory interpretation, such as text,
enactment context, or legislative history, the D.C. Circuit looked to a pair of statutes enacted in
2006 and 2006. It used these later-enacted statutes to determine whether the petitioner’s 2002
detention under a 2001 statute was lawful. The court of appeals thus looked to legislative action
six years into the habeas petitioner’s ongoing detention to determine the lawfulness of that
detention. To be sure, courts have looked to later-enacted statute to give meaning to an earlier
legislative provision. But this is rare. On one recent and controversial occasion, the Supreme
Court stated that “the meaning of one statute may be affected by other Acts, particularly where
Congress has spoken subsequently and more specifically to the topic at hand.” 105 But it did so in
a case where Congress has expressly considered the legal question at issue and where laterenacted legislation logically conflicted with one possible interpretation of the statute at issue.
Neither of these conditions obtain in Al-Bihani: Rather, the later-enacted statute concerns a
different subject matter, and the logical nexus is not compelling.106
More significantly, the circuit court’s decision to gauge detention authority in relation to
later-enacted statutes is inconsistent with a goal of promoting “fundamental political” liberty by
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the elimination of ambiguities in the law and the imposition of clear constraints on government
authority. If ongoing detentions can be defended by a detention power that is redefined by statute
eight years into the detention, there is little to prevent an amendment of the law so as to justify
detentions that otherwise would be illegal. The executive can detain and then craft requests for
post hoc detention around what it knows about its captives. The constraining effect of legality
dissolves. Rather than boosting legal predictability and stability, the D.C. Circuit’s approach
invites post hoc political interference at odds with Justice Kennedy’s predicate of “fundamental
political” liberty.
In sum, Boumediene’s promissory note for more ample “fundamentally political” liberty
is still unredeemed. The Supreme Court’s baffling failure to define detention authority has
opened the door to a new and confusing bifurcation of detention authority in the executive
branch, and an ambitious and broad reading of detention authority by a court of appeals that
leaves open ample possibility of post hoc manipulation by the political branches.
III.
How do these policy and doctrinal developments illuminate the relationship between
habeas, liberty, and the separation of powers? The data presented here cannot answer these
questions definitively. They concern only one temporally bounded policy (post-9/11 executive
detention). Nor do the data allow for identification of causal effects. One especially nettlesome
problem of inference is that post-Boumediene habeas came on line at roughly the same time as a
major political transition from President George W. Bush to President Barack H. Obama.
This Part sets out a tentative account of the data. For the sake of clarity, I first address the
most important potentially confounding variable—the concurrent political transition. I suggest
there is scant reason to believe that the presidential transition dampened any libertarian effect
from habeas. Returning to the data points explored in Part II, I tentatively advance some
hypotheses and further inquiries about the constitutional role of habeas corpus.
A.
The Supreme Court decided Boumediene in June 2008. But the first district court release
orders were not issued until December 2008, little more than one month before President
Obama’s inauguration. With the exception of Judge Leon, moreover, the Justice Department was
able to persuade all of the judges of the D.C. District Court to delay adjudication of habeas
petitions until the new Administration came into office. Hence, the political architects of
Guantánamo detention policy never had to explain their discrete detention decisions in federal
court. Habeas’s effects on release rates, if they exist, are comingled with and confounded by the
effects of that political transition.
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The change from a Republican to a Democratic Administration might be expected to
correlate with an increased emphasis on libertarian over security values. Polling data gathered by
the Pew Research Center from 2001 to 2007 reveals a “deep divide” on national security issues
between Republicans and Democrats, with a 20 percentage point difference in their willingness
to eliminate civil liberties.107 So more releases in the absence of judicial direction, therefore,
might be expected under President Obama than President Bush simply by dint of the
constituencies responsible for the former’s electoral victory. This might be expected to dilute the
libertarian effect of habeas as petitioners who would otherwise obtain judicial relief are
preemptively released by the Administration.
But this hypothesis is not borne out by the facts. The effect of the change in
Administration on security policy more generally has been ambiguous. Some commentators find
little practical difference.108 The new Administration also has reasons to move more slowly than
its supporters might wish. While left-libertarian members of the Administration may view the
volume of Guantánamo detentions as excessive, the new President may be unwilling to
antagonize its security agencies, such as the CIA. Presumably, it is difficult to secure desired
policy cooperation without buy-in from a substantial part of that agency’s leadership and senior
personnel.109 Worse for left-libertarians, release of detainees during a Democratic Administration
is more politically costly than release under Bush. Whereas few on either left or right attacked
the Bush White House for excessive leniency on its release policy, President Obama expected
and received assaults from the right on the issue.110 At the margin then, each release is more
costly at the polls for Obama than for Bush.
As I noted in Part II, the Obama White House crafted a mechanism for detention policymaking to reflect this political pressure: Delegating the hard decisions to someone else who
would take the political heat.111 Two days after his inauguration, on January 22, 2009, President
Obama established an interagency taskforce to “undertake a prompt and thorough review of the
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factual and legal bases” for detentions at Guantánamo.112 Styled as a body of neutral, but largely
military, expertise,113 the taskforce provided the Obama Administration with an argument that
releases would be the product of professional deliberation and calculus rather than first-order
liberal political preferences. Reliance on the taskforce mechanism meant delays in releases,
while the taskforce was assembled and began its work of assembling dossiers on the detainees.114
The taskforce also became a source of delay in the litigation, where the government argued that
any discovery access to files created by the taskforce about given detainees would delay
individual habeas proceedings by weeks or months.115 The effect of delay was to disperse a set of
hard decisions across an uncertain period of time, making it more difficult for the
Administration’s political opponents to mobilize against it. Looking at the taskforce mechanism,
it might thus be expected that the release rate for Guantánamo would drop immediately after the
January 2009 inauguration, as indeed seems to have been the case. On this account, internal
political change would not be a substitute for the libertarian effects of habeas.
In the litigation trenches, moreover, strategy has been characterized by stability rather
than change. Recall that Justice Department litigation strategy between 2002 and 2009 in the
habeas cases focused on jurisdictional issues. Its net effect was to deny or at least defer judicial
consideration of the merits in habeas cases. Under Obama’s direction, one might initially expect,
government lawyers may be less inclined to seek appellate review or otherwise delay a release.
More cases might go forward and more releases might result. An unsystematic review of a
sample of government papers via Westlaw, however, suggests that the personnel litigating the
Guantánamo cases have not changed significantly. Even if the Obama Administration wished to
change the way that the Guantánamo cases were litigated, moreover, it would be a complex
matter to obtain the personnel changes across two departments to achieve this end. Moreover, “it
takes time for presidents to staff the administrative state,”116 with higher offices attended to
before line positions.117 It is thus plausible to expect that government litigation strategy would
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not change significant with the Bush-Obama transition because of the difficulties confronting all
new presidents in reorienting policy and the tendency to do so from the top down.
To be sure, the effect of transition from the Bush White House to an Obama
Administration on detainee policy is far from predictable. On the contrary, they are highly
ambiguous. But perhaps the most plausible expectation is that the political transition would lead
to a dip in aggregate release rates as the taskforce came on line, but that the government’s
litigation strategy would likely remain constant.118 Against this backdrop, there is little reason to
expect that the libertarian effects of habeas would be diluted against the larger backdrop of
regime change.
B.
Even once the political change in the White House is accounted for, the data presented in
Section II still pose a complex interpretive challenge. Even setting aside problems with data
released by the government, changes in detention policy cannot be causally linked to activity in
the courts without considerable hesitation. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw some general
conclusions, and to attempt some more granular speculation about the likely influence of habeas
upon policy.
One central finding stands out: While the data is in many respects ambiguous, it strongly
suggests that the effect of Boumediene on detention policy was not significant. It is striking that
at the most, less than four percent of releases from the Cuban base have followed a judicial order
of release—and even in these case it is not wholly clear that release would not have happened
sooner or later. Moreover, the annualized number of releases drops after Boumediene. Even in
those few cases in which the habeas writ has been granted, nagging questions persist about the
scope and effective force of the federal court’s remedial authority. Courts to date (with two
exceptions) have been reluctant to direct outright release, and have instead issued delicately
phrased pleas to “try harder” to the executive (although in more than two dozen cases, the data
inn Table 2 show, the executive heeds this plea). From a distance, therefore, habeas seems far
from an effective tool of checking executive authority, despite the lack of evidence that
diplomatic efforts this late in the day will bear large fruit. The ambitious claims made in the
literature for and against Boumediene are thus misguided. As a practical matter, it appears that
the decision simply did not matter all that much.
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Further, there is no positive relationship between the doctrinal consequences of
Boumediene and its progeny on the one hand, and the “fundamentally political” liberty
celebrated by Justice Kennedy. The black-letter law of detention, and the implementation of that
law by the government, is no clearer, no more stable, and no more coherent than it was before
Boumediene. The latter case some doubt on the guiding force of Hamdi, while the D.C. Circuit’s
Al-Bihani decision blew past Hamdi in its haste to embrace legislative language from 2006 and
2009. The Al-Bihani Court’s methodology invites post hoc gerrymandering of detention policy
by Congress. The net result is bleak on either one of Boumediene’s metric: Habeas is not central
to the protection of physical liberty, at least in the experience of the Guantánamo detainees. And
“fundamentally political” liberty, to the extent that it is deepened by judicial confirmation of
clear bounds to executive authority, has been disserved, if not wholly displaced, by the
combination of Boumediene’s fecklessness and Al-Bihani’s invitation to mischief. Federal courts,
it seems, are too hesitant and circumspect in their approach to executive detention decisions to
vindicate “fundamentally political” liberty via the elaboration of black-letter rules. The data, on
this reading, should be little comfort for those who value the separation of power. Neither part of
Boumediene’s justifying logic, in other words, has yielded much by way of practical result. Its
consequences are on the one hand doctrinal ambiguity and on the other practically uncertain.
But that this not to say that the federal courts’ exercise of habeas jurisdiction has had no
effect upon the executive policy space. To observe an absence of large, direct effects from
habeas is not to rule out the possibility of smaller, indirect effects. Habeas, that is, may serve
liberty indirectly. Although the larger claims on behalf of habeas might be unwarranted, it is
certainly possible, and even probable, that habeas has a meaningful incentive effect that can be
traced in the data. To identify such an indirect effect entails situating the writ in a larger
institutional context of the courts’ interactions with other branches of government. The data
presented here does not allow a detailed investigation of such indirect connections. But it is
suggestive. In the balance of this paper, therefore, I sketch a tentative account of how federal
court action both before and after Boumediene has altered the executive’s options based on the
limited data available.
Start with the period before Boumediene, when, the natural assumption would be that
patterns of releases and detentions are unrelated to what goes on in the courts. But this
assumption may be overstated. From the perspective of a rational executive deciding on
detention policy under uncertainty, the Supreme Court’s rulings in Hamdi and Rasul might be
viewed as warnings from the Court—call them shots across the bow—that the government’s
approach to detention policy lacked the indicia of professionalism and reliability that the Court
searches for in granting the deference often evinced on national security and foreign affairs
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matters.119 As I have argued elsewhere,120 these decisions catalyzed important structural changes
to detainee policy within the government but skirted even the hint of individualized release.
Between Rasul and Hamdi, the Court forced the executive into a wholesale restructuring
of detainee processing. Until those decisions, the government had done little by way of release.
2004 is the first year in which a non-trivial number of releases can be observed. Until Rasul and
Hamdi, moreover, military officials would have had little reason to institute a meaningful
processing and release policy. It is highly unlikely that marginal fiscal effects have much
motivating effects in this area. It is far from clear that bureaucrats are ever sensitive to marginal
fiscal costs.121 In any event, the idea that terrorism detention should be driven by fiscal concerns
is almost entirely absent from current debate. On the other side of the ledger, individual releases
are politically costly as admissions of error by the government. Even if the nation would be
better off with a detention policy that appeared less lawless, institutional incentives might
preclude development of such a policy. On this account, Rasul and Hamdi break an equilibrium
characterized by an absence of releases by adding a new factor to officials’ calculations. In the
wake of those decisions, officials had to account for the risk that courts would intervene directly,
with potentially embarrassing consequences for officials.122
The observed pattern of releases, described in Figures 1 and 2 above, is at least consistent
with this account. There are spikes in release in November 2003, soon after the Supreme Court
granted the Rasul petitioners’ request for certiorari review,123 and in September 2004, two
months after the Rasul opinion was issued.124 That is, increases in the rate of releases might
correspond to judicial action raising the probability of intrusive judicial supervision. These
correspondences, however, are at best rough: The time lag between judicial events and policy
changes is between weeks and months. Confounding factors simply cannot be eliminated in
either case.
The data nonetheless allows the inference that Rasul and Hamdi had two important
indirect effects: They triggered sunshine and generated a “support infrastructure” that imposed
larger political and publicity costs for continued detentions. First, those decisions ratcheted up
the number of Guantánamo detainees with lawyers. In 2004, the habeas litigation in the Supreme
Court involved a mere fourteen individuals.125 By 2009, even after serial depletion of the
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detainee population, there are more than more 200 habeas actions filed. Many of the lawyers
work for large commercial law firms, doing habeas pro bono. Several such firms, such as
Venable LLP, Jenner & Block, WilmerHale, and Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, have close and
continuing contacts with government.126 Some lawyers quit commercial practice to work fulltime on habeas litigation. Coordinating this group, the Center for Constitutional Rights runs an
email list-service for the several hundred lawyers, located across the country, who represent
detainees. The net result of this activity was a “vibrant … support structure” akin to ones
observed in mid-twentieth century America prior to the civil rights revolution.127 At a minimum,
Rasul and Hamdi opened the door to the growth of this support structure. More ambitiously, it is
possible that the decisions had a legitimating effect on mobilization efforts in the private sphere
on behalf of the detainees.
Litigation leveraging this support structure meant lawyers visiting the Cuban base for the
first time in 2004.128 It meant not merely greater litigation pressure on the government, but, more
significantly, a much greater flow of potentially embarrassing information back to the United
States. In cases of obviously erroneous detention, the government chose release rather than
protracted litigation that could detract from the larger portrait painted of Guantánamo as
containing only highly dangerous detainees.129 Sunshine, that is, was one of the indirect results
of the Rasul and Hamdi decisions that generated new costs for the government.
Also consistent with this narrative is the parallel rise in detention operations at Bagram.
The increasing use of Bagram for detainees captured as far afield as Dubai and Thailand130 is
plausible evidence that Rasul and Hamdi prompted not only more robust internal procedures for
detention operations, but also jurisdictional circumvention. Just as the initial choice of
Guantánamo was driven by a concern to minimize “litigation risk,” so after Rasul and Hamdi it
was predictable that officials would look for new ways of reducing the costs of judicial
supervision. Hence the flight to Bagram. Today, the prospect of increased judicial supervision of
Bagram may well precipitate a flight to more durable redoubts from federal courts
superintendence. The recent U.S. decision to hand Bagram over to Afghan authorities, which in
effect raises a new jurisdictional hurdle to ongoing habeas litigation, corroborates this.131
The executive’s response to Boumediene provides further evidence of the judiciary’s
indirect influence on detention policy. On April 2, 2007, the Supreme Court initially denied
certiorari in Boumediene. The Court’s decision on June 29, 2007, to reverse course by granting a
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petition for rehearing in Boumediene was a surprise, and so provided new information about the
Court’s intentions.132 Petitions for rehearing are rarely granted by the Supreme Court. A
Bayesian executive would treat the grant of certiorari in Boumediene as telling evidence that
closer judicial scrutiny was forthcoming. The data in Figures 1 and 2 for the six-month period
from June 2007 onward show a higher rate of release correlated with the Boumediene certiorari
grant. Again, this is some evidence of an indirect effect from habeas jurisdiction. Moreover, the
proposition that the Court responds to signals of professionalization (or the lack thereof) gains
credibility from the manner of the Court’s decision to grant certiorari in Boumediene. As Daniel
Meltzer has persuasively argued, that volte-face is best understood in light of disclosures by
former military officers alleging that the military’s internal process used to sort detainees was
rigged to generate outcomes sought by the government.133 Jurisdiction is thus the progeny of
judicial distrust.
Now consider the policy landscape in the wake of Boumediene. By the end of 2008, the
effect of hundreds of releases had been to increase the concentration of detainees with more
substantial ties to terrorism, and to dilute the number of detainees with only weak connections to
al Qaeda or the Taliban. A lion’s share of easy cases has thus been resolved. The liberatory
effects of sunshine and litigation infrastructure were equally subject to diminishing returns.
Moreover, the shift from the Bush to Obama presidencies may have diminished the political
value of disclosure, which went for detainees’ advocates from being a convenient way of
embarrassing a disliked government to a delicate question to be negotiated with a presumptively
favorable administration.134 Remaining cases often presented difficulties because of foreign
policy complications attendant on release.135 Others, including many Yemenis, raised security
concerns related to conditions in their country of release.136 (Indeed, as of September 2009, a
third of the 78 detainees cleared for transfer were Yemeni, while 13 were Chinese Uighurs,
whose release was opposed by the Chinese government.137) That is, by the time of Boumediene,
the odds were that habeas would be too little, too late, as a remedy to unlawful detention.
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Despite these obstacles, the small minority of detainees who have habeas actions not only
proceed to final judgment but tend to obtain a favorable outcome of release. How might this
assuredly incremental effect be explained? One hypothesis would be that releases following
habeas actions are substitutes for, rather than complements to, releases in the absence of habeas
jurisdiction. That is, even the figure of 3.75% releases by habeas is an overstatement. Net
releases would, in fact not differ with or without habeas. To be sure, the thesis of habeas as
complete substitute rather than as complement cannot be ruled out. But it seems unlikely to
explain all the releases. First, in habeas litigation, the government routinely expends considerable
time, personnel, and even credibility with the federal bench arguing that individuals should be
detained. There is no reason to take this effort by the federal government at anything other than
face value. Second, and more powerfully, the evidence suggests that when the federal
government decides to release a detainee who has a pending habeas action, it does so without
continuing to context the habeas action.138 Given that the government abandons defense of
habeas actions when it determines a detainee should be released, there is no reason to believe
that its representations in otherwise contested actions is anything other than sincere. In short, it
may well be that attributing 3.75% of releases to habeas is an overestimate, but also unlikely that
the proper estimate is zero. Habeas, in short, has some effect in the cases in which a court
reaches a final judgment.
With respect to those habeas actions that do prevail, it is plausible to posit that habeas
counsel with stronger cases have tended to push more aggressively in court, rather than hoping to
negotiate a favorable outcome with the government. The first wave of habeas litigation in the
district court thus likely selected for strong cases in favor of release. In these cases, the district
court can dissolve a log-jam at the individual detainee level, just as the Hamdi and Rasul
judgments nudged the executive into more wholesale reconsideration of detainee processing.
Judicial action in these cases is evidence of a direct libertarian effect from habeas. But that direct
effect is numerically far less important than the indirect effects of habeas jurisdiction confirmed
in Rasul and Hamdi. That is, the bulk of releases (from 2004-08) have taken place against the
“shadow” of habeas jurisdiction.
In this light, there is a strong analogy between habeas litigation and theories of criminal
procedure that emphasize the indirect influence of constitutional rights upon plea-bargained
outcomes. As in the criminal adjudication context, the actual exercise of constitutional rights in
habeas may be less important than the “shadow” cast by the government’s expectation of those
rights.139 Detention policy thus largely unspools in the shadow of the Suspension Clause, not
under its direct gaze. So in the criminal context, a small number of cases do not settle through
138
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pleas because of the inability of lawyers on each side to converge in their assessment of the
expected trial outcome. Similarly, the residual core of litigated habeas may be explained by the
persistence of uncertainty as to trial outcomes. Habeas cases that proceed to judgment represent
instances of high variance in litigants’ expectations about outcomes. While the government
believes it has a strong case, detainee counsel believe that it is only bureaucratic inefficiencies or
sheer error that blocks release. District court litigation, on this account, is a product of epistemic
uncertainty about the bases for detention between habeas counsel and their government
counterparts.
However the litigation is explained, its effect on the margin is small—at most 3.75% and
perhaps little as zero. So if Justice Kennedy is right to point to a connection between habeas and
the freedom from unlawful constraints on physical liberty, the connection is at best complex and
indirect. Further, the data reviewed in this essay are simply too ambiguous to confirm such a
relationship, even if they are sufficient to reject the thesis that the relationship is a large one. The
available public record is simply far too hazy to permit any precise estimate of habeas’s effect on
executive detention policy, beyond the conclusion that any direct effect is likely small.
Moreover, the forms of habeas review remain very much a work in progress, subject to
congressional or high court reworking.
Despite this uncertainty, I will recklessly hazard here some predictions. First, easy cases
for release will run out as low-hanging fruit are consumed.140 Increasingly, detainees will lose in
the district courts, particularly since the D.C. Circuit’s since vacated judgment in Kiyemba v.
Obama141 signals the circuit court’s limited tolerance for creative remedial options. The Supreme
Court’s decision to send that case back to the lower courts based on government assertions of
changed facts, rather than addressing it on the merits, further signals that the high court too is
unwilling to interfere too much with political branch choices. Those detainees who prevail, but
do not secure release because of forward-looking risk assessments by the interagency
taskforce,142 will also obtain less and less sympathy on the remedial front. District courts judges
have already expressed unease at pushing too hard upon the executive. In a December 2009
hearing, for example, Chief Judge Hogan bemoaned the “unfortunate” fact that “the Legislative
Branch of our government, and the Executive Branch have not moved more strongly to provide
uniform clear rules and laws for handling these cases.”143 More tellingly, even the release orders
140
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currently issued in the habeas actions do not call directly for physical release. In ambiguous
terms, all but one require the government to engage in “all necessary and appropriate diplomatic
steps to facilitate” release.144 Only two, Judge Huvelle’s order concerning the juvenile detainee
Muhammed Jawad and Judge Kessler’s concerning Alla Ali bin Ali Ahmed, directly ordered
release.145 Jawad’s case, though, was exceptional, and had already been a subject of
controversy.146 This pattern suggests that while courts might press the government on procedural
and evidentiary issues, there remains at bottom a concern about noncompliance. That is, courts
continue to tread cautiously in the post-Boumediene habeas cases, unsure of the boundaries of
their own ability to press the Administration to alter course. When push comes to shove, molar
security concerns will dominate granular liberty interest, even for detainees found to be
unconnected to any terrorist group.
At the same time that indirect and direct effects of habeas jurisdictional fade, the federal
courts have done just enough to deflate significant social mobilization in favor of further
releases. Boumediene, recall celebrates legality but without furnishing any constraining law. At
the time of this writing, the received wisdom in policy circles147 calls for fresh legislative
involvement in detention issues. Such calls are made under circumstances wherein the only kind
of legislative action that could pass would expand detention authority and further restrict the
fragmented and incomplete influence of habeas review. They not only trade on a critique of
judicial activism with distinctively partisan roots, but, more importantly, fail to account
accurately for either for the subordinate position of courts or the primacy of political actors’
efforts to anticipate, circumvent, and otherwise marginalize judicial action. The Court, that is,
has largely succeeded in diffusing effective libertarian political mobilization round detention as a
national policy issue.
This analysis further has implications for future research. Important recent scholarship on
the habeas has focused on procedural questions of proof and evidentiary standards as a locus of
144
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“significant policy questions about competing risks and their distributions.”148 More ambitiously,
other scholars have asserted that the courts “use procedure as a corrective to decision-making by
one (or both) of the coordinate branches.”149 Although this procedural turn may produce valuable
insights, it should be complemented with an effort to understand the incentives and felt
limitations confronting federal judges in the habeas cases. How conscious, for example, are
judges of political constraints on their ultimate remedial authority? To the extent that the
judiciary’s relationship with the Bush Administration came to be characterized by mistrust, has
the shift to the Obama Administration sapped judges’ incentives to regulate detention decisions
closely? However tricky such questions are to answer for evidentiary reasons, it may well be that
the perceived balance of authority and legitimacy between the judicial and executive branches
shapes the course of habeas litigation more than formal doctrinal consequences that until now
attracted legal scholars’ attention.
Conclusion
Boumediene has been called “one of the most important Supreme Court decisions in
recent years.”150 But at best Boumediene secured liberty from unlawful constraint only at the
margins—the most important work had been done long before by Rasul and Hamdi—and failed
in its pursuit of a more ambitious separation-of-powers aim. The analysis here does not condemn
habeas is wholly ineffective. Rather, it suggest that misty nostrums of separated powers provide
little guidance or insight into how federal courts and their coordinate political branches interact
to benefit or burden the exercise of human liberty. The effects of habeas jurisdiction have been
uncertain and perhaps marginal. Before better data illuminates the relationship between judicial
actions and executive policy, rhetoric either praising or condemning Boumediene is at a
minimum premature.
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Figure 1: Trends in Detainee Population at Guantánamo (2002-2009)
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Figure 2: Trends in Guantánamo population changes, aggregate releases/transfers, and
annualized releases and transfers (2002-2009)
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Figure 3: Trends in Detainee Population at the Bagram Theater Internment Facility
(2002-2009)151
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Figure 4: Trends in Releases After Favorable Habeas Judgment (“Habeas Releases”) and
In The Absence of Judicial Decree (“Non-Habeas Releases”) (December 2008 – December
2009)
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